How do norms of trust and reciprocity arise? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects play a series of indefinitely repeated trust games. Players are randomly and anonymously matched each period. The parameters of the game are chosen so as to support trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium when no reputational information is available. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player's past history of play and how long that history must be. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.
Introduction
Trust is a key element in sustaining specialization and trade. In many economic transactions, trust emerges among essentially anonymous agents who have little recourse to direct or immediate punishment.
For instance, in electronic commerce, it is easy to create new identities, and buyers and sellers often engage in what are, essentially, one-shot transactions. Nevertheless, it is claimed that there are more than 100 million users on eBay! In the credit card market, individual card-holders frequently display little loyalty to any particular bank or card issuer, freely switching balances between credit cards. Similarly, few tourists repeatedly return to the same vacation area to consume again in the same hotel or restaurant.
Given the anonymous and infrequent nature of economic transactions in these markets, an important question is how such markets can work efficiently. In particular, what is the incentive for sellers in electronic markets to deliver the goods purchased, or of the quality promised, knowing that they are unlikely to meet the same buyer again? What is the incentive for borrowers to repay credit card debts if they can switch to another lender next time? What is the incentive for hotels and restaurants in vacation areas to provide good service, knowing that the same consumers are unlikely to ever return?
One possibility is that such incentive problems can be solved by a legal process. However, in many instances, the cost of litigation would far exceed the benefit from the transaction; in such instances legal considerations can simply be ruled out. On the other hand, we do observe that in all of these markets there exist reputation systems that collect and disseminate information about market participants. For instance, in most electronic markets there is an online feedback system that allows buyers to rate their prior transaction experiences with sellers and this information is publicly (and typically freely) available. In the credit card market, third party credit bureaus collect information about the customers of all banks and credit card companies and provide the information to other financial institutes, typically for a small fee.
Travel guides and websites (e.g. Tripadvisor) provide feedback from tourists about hotels and restaurants in vacation areas.
In this paper we examine two mechanisms by which trust and the reciprocation of trust might be sustained in a population of anonymous strangers. We first examine the hypothesis that trust might be attached to a society as a whole; the fear of the destruction of that trust might suffice to enforce trustworthy behavior by all members of the society as shown by Kandori (1992) . On the other hand, such a mechanism might be too fragile and so we also examine the possibility that trustworthiness resides at the individual rather than at the societal level. In particular, we ask whether the provision of information on individual reputations for trustworthiness engenders greater trust than in the case where such information is absent. We further explore whether the free provision of reputational information is responsible for our findings or whether the availability of acquiring such information (at a small cost) suffices to sustain greater trust and reciprocity.
To explore these issues, we conduct an experiment that uses a version of the two-player sequential "trust" (or "investment") game (Berg et al., 1995) . In our version of this game, the first mover or "investor" decides whether to invest his endowment with the second mover, the "trustee," resulting in an uncertain payoff. Alternatively the investor can simply keep his endowment. If the investor invests (or "trusts"), the endowment is multiplied by a fixed factor that is greater than 1 and it falls to the trustee to decide whether to keep the whole amount or return some fraction of it to the investor (or "reciprocate"), keeping the rest for himself. Subjects are asked to play this game for several indefinite sequences (supergames), each consisting of a number of periods. In each period, they are randomly and anonymously matched with one another. Within this framework, we examine several different treatments.
In our baseline treatment (and in fact, in all of our treatments), the trust game is parameterized in such a way that, given the number of participants and random anonymous matching, a social norm where all investors invest (trust) and all trustees return part of the investment (reciprocate) constitutes a sequential equilibrium without any information provided to investors regarding the identity of their current trustee or that trustee's past history of play. In a second treatment, everything is the same as in the baseline treatment except that, prior to making a decision, the investor can observe the trustee's action choice in the prior period (Keep or Return). In a third treatment, everything is the same as in the second treatment except that, prior to making a decision, the investor can observe a longer history of the trustee's prior choices in the current supergame. Finally, in a fourth treatment, everything is the same as in the third treatment, except that the investor must first choose whether to pay a small cost to view the trustee's history of actions for the current supergame. If the investor does not pay this information cost then, from the investors' perspective, the game is similar to our first baseline treatment where the investor has no knowledge of the prior actions of the trustee with whom he is matched. If the investor does pay for this information, then, from the investor's perspective, the game is similar to that of our third treatment.
Importantly, in our fourth treatment, the trustee does not know whether the investor has purchased information about the trustee's past behavior.
In the first treatment, where no individual information is available, we are able to test the theoretical possibility that a social norm of trust and reciprocity can be sustained by anonymous, randomly matched agents out of the fear that deviating from such a norm would precipitate a contagious wave of distrust and retaliatory non-reciprocation. We find that there is very little trust and reciprocity in this baseline treatment.
Our second treatment asks whether "minimal" reputational information at the individual level can improve matters, specifically whether additional information on the prior-period behavior of trustees (secondmovers) causes these players to reciprocate (Return) more often and if so, whether this change in trustees' behavior engenders greater trust on the part of investors who move first. We find that, when minimal information on the trustee's prior-period choice is provided following the absence of such a reputational mechanism (treatment 1 to treatment 2), it leads to a large and significant increase in both trust and reciprocity. However, reversing the order, when minimal information about trustees is initially provided and then removed (treatment 2 to treatment 1) we find no significant difference in the levels of trust and reciprocity between these two treatments. When the amount of information about trustees is increased (in our third treatment) to include the frequency with which the trustee has played return in all periods of the in the current supergame, we find that such order effects disappear: the provision of a longer history of information about trustees leads to significant increases in trust and reciprocity relative to the absence of such information, regardless of treatment order. Finally, in our fourth treatment, where investors must decide whether to purchase full information on the decisions their matched trustee in the current supergame (provided freely in our third treatment), we find that on average, only one-fourth of investors choose to purchase this information, so that the other three-fourths are in the dark about the prior behavior of their current trustee. Nevertheless, trust and reciprocity is significantly higher in this costly information treatment as compared with the baseline, no-information treatment.
We conclude that the emergence of trust and reciprocity resides with the availability of individual reputational information as provided, for example, by a credit bureau and not through society-wide enforcement of a social norm of good behavior. We further conclude that longer histories are more beneficial than shorter histories in the promulgation of reputational concerns.
Related Literature
We are not the first to explore the mechanisms supporting trust and reciprocity among anonymous strangers. Our research draws upon several prior theoretical and experimental studies.
Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game under Random Matching
With anonymous random matching, Kandori (1992) shows that cooperation may be possible if all players adhere to a "contagious strategy" in which individuals who have not experienced a defection choose "Cooperation," and individuals who have either experienced a defection by their opponent or have defected themselves in the past choose "Defection." Specifically, he shows that for an infinite horizon and for any fixed population size, we can define payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma game that sustain cooperation in a sequential equilibrium.
As pointed out by Kandori (1992) , there are two substantial problems associated with a "contagious equilibrium." First, when the population is large, the argument applies only to games with extreme payoff structures. Second, a single defection causes a permanent end to cooperation and this fragility may make the equilibrium inappropriate as a model for trade.
Ellison (1994) extends Kandori's work and remedies these problems by introducing a public randomization device which adjusts the severity of the punishment. Compared to Kandori's (1992) results, the equilibrium in Ellison (1994) does not require excessive patience on the part of players and applies to more general payoff structures. Furthermore, given public randomizations, the equilibrium strategy supports nearly efficient outcomes even when players make mistakes with a small probability.
Duffy and Ochs (2009) conduct an experimental test of Kandori's (1992) contagious equilibrium using groups of subjects who play an indefinitely repeated two-person Prisoner's Dilemma under different matching protocols and different amounts of information transmission. Their results show that, under fixed pairings there appears to develop a social norm of cooperation as subjects gain experience, while under random matching, experience tends to drive groups toward a far more competitive norm, even when some information is provided about the prior choices of opponents. Thus they conclude that random matching works to prevent the development of a cooperative norm in the laboratory. Camera and Casari (2009) address the same issue of cooperation under random matching, but focus on the role of private or public monitoring of the anonymous (or non-anonymous) players' choices and find that such monitoring can lead to a significant increase in the frequency of cooperation relative to the case of no monitoring.
In contrast to these papers, in this study we examine the indefinitely repeated "trust" game instead of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the trust (or "investment") game (Berg et al., 1995 ) has 1) sequential moves and 2) no dominant strategy. In particular, the first mover has an incentive to trust if he believes the second mover will reciprocate, while the second mover has an incentive not to reciprocate even if the first mover chooses to trust. This game is more closely related to many real-world one-sided incentive problems found, for example, in credit markets or in transactions between buyers and sellers in cyberspace (e-Commerce), where two players move sequentially and only the second mover always wants to deviate from reciprocation in the one-shot game. 1 The one-sided incentive problem of the trust game may be a more promising environment for the achievement of a social norm of cooperation (trust and reciprocity) under anonymous random matching than the Prisoner's Dilemma game with its two-sided incentive problem. Furthermore we note that most real-world reputation systems are designed to monitor the behavior of "second movers". For these reasons, we think it is important to study the trust game under anonymous random matching and with various levels of information on second movers.
Repeated Trust Games
Lee and Xie (2009) theoretically extend Kandori's (1992) argument to the development of trust and 1 Kandori (1992) has a formal definition of a "one-sided incentive problem" (Definition 4 on page 73). The concept requires that, only one of two parties has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome, and there is a Nash equilibrium such that the payoff from the equilibrium is less than the payoff from the cooperative outcome for the party who has the incentive problem. reciprocity among anonymous, randomly matched players in the infinitely repeated trust game and provide sufficient conditions that support a social norm of trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium in the absence of reputational information. The trust game experiment we report on in this paper satisfies the Lee and Xie conditions in all treatments, so that in the absence of any information about one's randomly determined opponents, a social norm of trust and reciprocity may be sustained by the threat to move to a contagious wave of distrust and confiscation. However, we also explore the notion that some information about opponents' prior behavior may help to sustain social norms of trust and reciprocity, as such information makes it easier for players to discern player types thus enabling reputational considerations.
There are several experimental papers on repeated trust games that relate to this study. Bolton et al. They compare the results from three treatments: a stranger market, where individual buyers and sellers meet no more than once and the buyer has no information about the seller's transaction history; a feedback market, which has the same matching rule as the stranger market and provides the seller's histories of shipping decisions to the buyer; finally, a partners market, where the same buyer-seller pairs interact repeatedly in every period. Not surprisingly, transaction efficiency, trust and trustworthiness (reciprocity) are smallest in the stranger market, greater in the feedback market, and greatest in the partners market. Brown and Zehnder (2007) conduct an experiment in which they use trust games to study the effect of 1) a public credit registry and 2) relationship banking in a competitive market. The main treatments are whether credit reporting is available or not, and whether the public ID of players is random or fixed; only the latter allows relationship banking. They found that when the relationship banking is not feasible (random ID treatment), the credit market essentially collapses in the absence of credit reporting. However, when bilateral relationships are feasible, as when player IDs are fixed and known, the effect of credit reporting is negligible. Therefore, both credit reporting and relationship banking can significantly improve the performance of credit markets. Charness, et al. (2009) examine the effect of different kinds of information about trustees. Subjects take turns playing both roles-first mover (investor) or second mover (trustee)-in a finitely repeated version of the trust game we propose in this paper. First movers either receive information on the history of return behavior by their matched trustee or on the history of invest (trust) decisions by their matched trustee when that trustee was in the investor (first mover) role. They find that both types of histories can significantly increase trust relative to the absence of such information.
Finally, Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) examine whether and how the exogenously determined length of past relationships affects trust and trustworthiness in new relationships. Participants in their experiment play several supergames. Each supergame consists of a sequence of periods of play of the trust game by the same two players (fixed matches). The lengths of these supergames were drawn prior to the first session. The treatments focus on whether initial sequences of short-or long-supergames impacts on the extent of trust and trustworthiness found in subsequent supergames. They find that initial shortsupergame relationships have a negative impact on both trust and trustworthiness in the relationships that immediately follow, while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite effect. As subjects gain experience, the effect declines for trustworthiness (reciprocity) but not for trust.
These papers differ from our paper in several significant ways. Finally, this paper is also related to the literature examining the historic development of economic institutions in fostering trade among strangers such as the analysis on medieval trade by Greif (1989 Greif ( , 1993 and Milgrom et al. (1990) . These papers model a large number of traders who are randomly paired with each other in each period. Each pair is presumed to play a game similar to the trust game, where one party has an incentive to cheat the other by supplying goods of inferior quality or reneging on promises to make future payments. In this literature, institutions are seen as a way of avoiding the inefficiency of noncooperative equilibria. Greif (1989) and Milgrom et al. (1990) argue that the exchange of information on the identity of cheaters or the development of a mechanism which strengthen the power of enforcement can help sustain cooperation.
The Model
In this section we briefly describe the model and its predictions for our experimental design. Here we follow the notation of Lee and Xie (2009) . The set of players is partitioned into two 2 Many experimental studies find that trust and reciprocity prevail under the conditions of complete anonymity and one-shot interaction. As these behaviors are inconsistent with all participants being payoff maximizers, they are often explained by psychological factors such as fairness, altruism, and inequality aversion etc. (Berg et al. (1995) return for a payoff of 1 for himself and 0 for the investor or to return a fraction 0 1 to the investor, earning a payoff of 1 for himself. Throughout we shall assume that . The trust game we study and its payoff structure are described in Figure 1 . 
Figure 1: The Trust Game
If the game is played once, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the investor not to invest as the trustee would always choose to play Keep. Since the investor's return from investing is greater than the outside option , it is efficient for the investor to invest. Although the efficient outcome cannot be achieved in the one-shot trust game, it can be achieved in the "contagious equilibrium" when the trust game is infinitely repeated, even if players are anonymously and randomly re-matched after each period. 3 Notice that both players in our version of the trust game have binary choice sets. This simplification is necessary for the theoretical analysis that follows. The idea of the contagious strategy is that trust applies to the community as a whole and cannot be applied to individuals because of random anonymous matchings. Therefore, a single defection by a member means the end of trust in the whole community and a player who experiences dishonest behavior starts defecting against all of his opponents (Kandori, 1992) . It is shown below that we can define payoffs for the trust game which allow trust and reciprocity to be a sequential equilibrium for any finite population.
Contagious equilibrium
To show that the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that one-shot deviations are unprofitable after any history. In particular, Lee and Xie (2009) provide these conditions in the following lemma which puts constraints on investors' and trustees' incentives not to deviate from the contagious strategy both on-the-equilibrium-path and off-the-equilibrium-path. 
Condition (1) controls the investor's incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy off-theequilibrium-path. Due to the one-sided nature of the incentive problem, Invest is the best response to Return, so the investor has no incentive to deviate on-the-equilibrium-path. Condition (1) requires that a dtype investor defect forever (never go back to Invest), even if she believes there is only one d-type trustee, which is the most favorable situation for investment. The left hand side of inequality (1), a , is the investor's opportunity cost from choosing Invest, and the right hand side of inequality (1) is the expected payoff from Return given that there is only one d-type trustee.
The implication of condition (1) is that the existence of the contagious equilibrium requires a high outside option. For the development of a cooperative social norm, the concept of the contagious equilibrium requires a harsh punishment scheme. Not only are those who deviate from the desired behavior punished, but a player who fails to punish is in turn punished himself (Kandori, 1992) . So, an investor must defect forever once she is cheated upon. To control the d-type investor's incentive to start investing again off-the-equilibrium-path, the outside option a must be high enough.
Condition (2) controls the trustee's incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy both on-theequilibrium-path and off-the-equilibrium-path. Notice that b represents both the trustee's extra payoff from one-period defection and his loss from one-period return at the same time. The first part of condition The lemma above is used in the proof of the following theorem, which states that we can find values for and in the trust game that satisfy the sufficient conditions of the lemma. 
Equilibria when information about trustees is available
In this paper, we consider as an alternative to anonymous, community-wide enforcement, environments where information on an individual trustee's past history of play can be observed by an investor prior to the investor making a decision to invest or not. We focus on the case of one-sided information flow (investors only view information on trustees and not vice versa) as this seems most appropriate for the trust game with its one-sided incentive problem, and because this information set-up also follows that of many real-world examples, e.g., credit markets. Specifically, we consider two different trustee histories that may be available to the investor: 1) "minimal information", where the investor observes only the action chosen by the trustee in the prior period (Keep, Return, or no choice) and 2) "full information", where the trustee's past history of decisions in all prior random matches with investors is revealed to the investor with whom the trustee is currently matched. We further consider an environment where the full information is available to investors only at some cost, 0. The following propositions apply to these environments with costless or costly information on the trustee's history of play.
Proposition 1: When information on the past behavior of trustees is free and full, the contagious strategy
is not an equilibrium strategy. on information about trustee's prior behavior, an equilibrium involving complete trust and reciprocity will be easier to sustain in the case of full information than in the case of minimal information. Intuitively, the discount factor cannot be too high in the equilibrium under minimal information, since a d-type trustee will have an incentive to attempt to remove his bad reputation by engaging in one-shot good behavior in the current period so as to appear to be a c-type and attract investment in future periods. This problem does not arise in the case of full information, because in that case it is impossible for a d-type trustee to change his type as perceived by investors.
Our final proposition applies to environments where the investor may choose to purchase full information about a trustee's past history of play at a per period cost of 0. The information purchase decision is private information; the trustee does not know whether or not his matched investor has chosen to purchase information. For this environment, we propose the following asymmetric equilibrium: only a fraction of investors choose to purchase information (or equivalently, each investor chooses to purchase information with a probability); a fraction of trustees always choose Return and the remaining trustees always choose Keep. For some intuition as to why there is a mixture of behavior in the equilibrium of this environment, suppose that all trustees always chose Return. Then investors would not need to purchase information, since the value of information is to distinguish trustees with a good reputation from those with a bad reputation. However if none of the investors purchased information yet they still invested with a positive probability, then trustees would have strong incentives to defect. Therefore, investors should play a mixed strategy with regard to the information purchase decision, provided the cost is small enough. given in the proof of Proposition 3), there exists an equilibrium in which only some investors purchase information about trustees and, consequently some trustees play Keep. Hence, an implication of making full information costly is that trust and reciprocity may be lower than when full information is costless.
While there are many equilibria with positive levels of trust and reciprocity when information is costly (these are indexed by ), we focus our analysis (as we have done previously) on the most efficient of these equilibria, which obtains when investors choosing not to purchase information always choose Invest
Of course, as stated in Corollary 2, the inefficient equilibrium where all investors choose not to purchase information and No Invest and all trustees choose Keep continues to exist. Thus, there is also an empirical question as to whether information will be purchased at all in the costly information environment. We examine the latter question as well as all of the other theoretical predictions of this section by designing and analyzing results from a laboratory experiment. We now turn to this exercise.
Experimental Design
Our main treatment variable concerns the information available to investors in advance of their investment decision. We investigate four different "information treatments." In the first, "no information" treatment (denoted as No), investors only know their own history of play and payoff in each period.
Nevertheless, in this environment, trust and reciprocity (the play of Invest and Return) can be supported under random anonymous matching via the contagious strategy. In the second, "minimal information" treatment (denoted as Min), investors are informed of the prior-period decision of their current paired trustee, i.e., whether that trustee chose Keep or Return in the prior period, in the event the trustee had the opportunity to make a choice in the prior period; if the trustee did not have an opportunity to make a decision in the prior period, the information reported to the investor is No Choice. In the third, "information" treatment (denoted as Info), investors are told the frequencies with which their currently matched trustee chose either Keep or Return out of the total number of opportunities the trustee had to make either choice over all prior periods of the current supergame. The latter information is all that is necessary to label a trustee as either a c-or d-type, consistent with Propositions 1-3. In addition, investors were also shown the trustee's actual, period-by-period history of play (Return, Keep or No Choice) for up to 10 prior periods of the current supergame. 4 Finally, in the fourth, "costly information" treatment (denoted as Cost), investors are not automatically provided with information on their paired trustee's previous choices as in the Info treatment; instead, the investors can choose to purchase the same information provided in the Info treatment at a small cost.
The parameterization of the stage game used in all experimental sessions is given in Figure 2 . In this figure, the terminal nodes of the tree give the number of points each type of subject earned under the three possible outcomes for each stage game played. This parameterization of the game was chosen to be consistent with our theoretical assumption that 35 45 100 and also satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) of the Lemma in the prior section given the choice of 3 pairs of players and the induced period discount factor 80 .   used in all of our experimental sessions. 5 While other parameterizations are possible, we chose a parameterization that is not at the boundary of the conditions (1)- (2), but instead lies well within the region supporting trust and reciprocity among randomly matched players. 6 The cost of this fact was made clear to subjects. Note further that the expected duration of a supergame, given our choice of .80, is just 5 periods. 5 A computer program used to verify condition (2) is available upon request. 6 In many experimental implementations of trust games, the trustee is given a positive endowment so as to avoid the possibility that the investor feels compelled (out of some sense of fairness) to invest. While this may be an issue in one-shot games, it seems less relevant in our repeated random-matching trust game, where (as we discuss below) all players are equally likely to be assigned the role of investor or trustee at the start of each new supergame, and are paid for all periods of all supergames played. Therefore, each subject in our design is effectively given the same "endowment" in expected terms. Related to the real life examples that motivate our paper, e.g., borrowing in credit markets, it also seems more reasonable to assume that only the first mover (bank) has an outside option (endowment); if a transaction does not occur, then the bank keeps its money while the borrower earns 0. Finally, according to the theory we are testing, giving the trustee a positive endowment does not matter for any of our equilibrium predictions. For all of these reasons we did not provide an endowment to the trustee. The experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) . All of our experimental sessions involve groups of size 2 6 subjects, who were randomly assigned the role of investor or trustee at the start of each indefinitely repeated supergame. 7 This design gives subjects experience with both roles. We chose to work with groups of 6 subjects for several reasons. First, and most importantly, condition (1) for the existence of the contagious equilibrium in the trust game (where ) is more difficult to satisfy when n is large. On the other hand, we did not want the expected frequency of repeat matchings to be as high as in the minimal group size of 4. Finally, we wanted to give the contagious equilibrium a chance to work; it is well known that the contagious equilibrium involving complete trust and reciprocity can collapse due to noise or trembles, and such noise is likely to increase with the size of the group. 8 An indefinitely repeated supergame was implemented as follows. Players were assigned fixed roles for the duration of each supergame (investor or trustee). In each period the 3 investors and 3 trustees were randomly and anonymously matched with one another for a single play of the stage game. At the end of play of the stage game, the results of the game were reported to each pair of subjects and then a 10-sided die was rolled. If the die came up 8 or 9, the supergame was declared over; otherwise the game continued on with another period. Subjects were randomly rematched before playing the next period, though they remained in the same role in all periods of that supergame. We told them that we would play a number of sequences (i.e., indefinitely repeated supergames) but did not specify how many. For transparency and credibility purposes, we had the subjects take turns rolling the 10-sided die themselves and calling out the result. Our design thus implements random and anonymous matching, a discount factor,
.  
, and the stationarity associated with an infinite horizon.
In all of the informational mechanisms discussed above, information on the trustee' behavior in previous supergames does not carry over when a new supergame begins. In the treatments where information is available, it is available from the start of the second period of each supergame.
We used a within-subjects design in all sessions. Subjects begin to play under one information condition and were switched to the second condition (and then to the third in some sessions). In practice, there are at least 30 periods under each information condition in all sessions. When the total number of periods under one information condition exceeded approximately 30 periods, we made that supergame the 7 In the instructions (Appendix B) we use neutral word "First Mover" for investor, "Second Mover" for trustee, and "sequence" for indefinitely repeated supergame. We also use "A" "B" "C" "D" to denote the investor and trustee's choices. See Appendix for instructions. 8 Camera and Casari (2009) offer a similar justification for their choice of a group size of 4. Duffy and Ochs (2009) look at groups of size 6 as well as larger groups of size 14 and find cooperation rates under random anonymous matchings are twice as high on average in groups of size 6 as compared with groups of size 14. last supergame played under that treatment condition. Subjects were only informed of the change in an information condition when the switch took place, i.e., they did not know that a change was coming.
We have in total 14 experimental sessions which we have divided up into two main sets. The first set of eight experimental sessions examines whether providing investors with no information or minimal information on a trustee's prior behavior results in any significant difference. We conducted four No_Min sessions (sessions that began with "no information" and switched to "minimal information", similar . We reverse the order of the first two treatments to examine whether the timing of when information is available matters. The Cost treatment is always the last treatment since we wanted to have subject experience the information for free before they faced a decision as to whether to purchase that information at a small cost.
The motivations for this experimental design follow from our theoretical model. First, under our parameterization of the model the contagious strategy supports a social norm of full trust and reciprocity among randomly matched anonymous players when no information on trustees is available. However, we cannot exclude other equilibria, e.g., the social norm of no trust and no reciprocity is another one. So it remains an empirical question as to whether community-wide enforcement suffices to support a social norm of trust and reciprocity and whether different informational mechanisms can help select different social norms.
Second, since the collection, storage and dissemination of information is always costly for a society, a question of practical interest is how much reputational information is enough in order to significantly enhance the frequencies of trust and reciprocity. Thus we are not only interested in examining whether there are differences when information is available or not, but also whether any such differences depend on the quantity of information provided. That is one motivation for why we consider both the Min and Finally, the Cost treatment recognizes that information on trustees' past history would be costly to gather and that the costs of gathering such information would likely be paid by the information consumers, i.e., the investors. The Cost treatment thus addresses the role of information on trust and reciprocity in a more empirically relevant setting. Importantly, trustees are not informed of whether their paired investor purchased information about them or not, and this fact is public knowledge. Thus, on the one hand, if some fraction of investors choose to purchase information about trustees (and act according to the content of that information) their decisions can potentially provide a positive externality to the whole community due to the anonymity of matching and information purchasing. On the other hand, if trustees believe that some fraction of investors will not purchase information, they may behave similarly as in the No treatment.
Our Proposition 3 predicts this kind of mixed equilibrium outcome.
All subjects were recruited from the undergraduate populations of the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. No subject had any prior experience participating in our experiment.
Subjects were given $5 for showing up on time and completing the experiment and they were also paid their earnings from all periods of all supergames played. Subjects accumulated points given their stage game choices (points are shown in Figure 2 , the cost of information is set 2 points). Total points from all periods of all supergames were converted into dollars at a fixed and known rate of 1 point = ½ cent. use of the various amounts of information about trustees across both sets of sessions.
Results

Session
No_Min and Min_No Sessions
We first analyze whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity is possible when there is no information available on trustees and compare that with the case where "minimal" information on trustees'
prior-period action -Keep or Return--is freely provided. We begin with a within-subject analysis and then move to a between-subject analysis. While the payoffs for the game were chosen so that the contagious strategy supports an equilibrium of full trust and reciprocity, other equilibrium possibilities cannot be ruled out, for example zero trust and reciprocity by all players remains an equilibrium strategy. What we find is that the frequency of Investand-Return (trust and reciprocity, Table 2 .3) averages around one-third across all sessions of the No treatment. While this is far from 100%, it is also significantly different from zero (two-tailed t test, p<.01).
Notice also that the observed frequencies of Invest (trust), Return-given-Invest (reciprocity) are also less than 100% but significantly different from zero in the No treatment (two-tailed t test, p<.01).
Our next finding makes use of our within-subjects design to compare behavior with and without minimal information. Since the subjects were not informed of the second treatment until the change in treatment mid-way through a session, we may regard the first treatment of each session as an independent observation that was not influenced by other information treatments. We find that regardless of whether the first treatment is No or Min information, the session-level frequencies of Invest and Invest-and-Return are not significantly different from one another. However, the frequency of Return-given-Invest is significantly higher when minimal information is available in the first treatment (Robust Rank Order test, p<0.05). The latter finding implies that the provision of information has a more significant effect on the behavior of trustees than on the behavior of the recipients of minimal information--the investors! For the between-subject tests using only the No treatment session-level data, we find that there are no significant differences in the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return when the No treatment is in the first half of the No_Min sessions or in the second half of the Min_No sessions.
However, for the between-subjects tests using only the Min treatment session-level data, all frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Invest-and-Return are significantly higher when the minimal information is provided in the second half of the No_Min sessions than in the first half of the Min_No sessions (Robust Rank Order test, p<0.05 for all three tests). These findings strongly suggest that when minimal information is provided to subjects who have suffered from the absence of reputational information as in our No_Min sessions, they learn to use the minimal information more effectively than subjects who begin interacting with minimal information and then lose access to that information as in our Min_No sessions.
No_Info_Cost and Info_No_Cost Sessions
We next report results from the second set of sessions which involved three different treatments. 
Finding 3: The free provision of a longer history of information to investors on the past behavior of their matched trustee leads to a significant increase in trust and reciprocity relative to the No treatment regardless of whether the provision of information occurs before or after the No treatment.
Support for Finding 3 is found using a within-subjects analysis of session-level differences in Invest,
Return-given-Invest and Invest-and-Return between the No and Info treatments. (one-tailed Wilcoxon
signed ranks test, p<0.05 for all three tests).
Consider next the Cost treatment where investors are provided with the possibility to purchase information at a cost of 2 points. Consistent with Finding 3, the frequencies of trust and reciprocity in the Cost treatment remain significantly greater than when no information is available (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p<0.05 for all three tests). Furthermore, we also have the following (using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test at the 10% significance level):
Finding 4: The frequencies of Invest (trust) and Invest-and-Return (trust and reciprocity) are not significantly different in the Info treatment and Cost treatment. The frequency of Return-given-Invest (reciprocity) is significantly higher in the Info treatment than in the Cost treatment.
Finding 4 is consistent with the prediction of our Proposition 3: trustees recognize that when information is costly not all investors will purchase it and consequently they do not play Return as often as in the Info treatment. This finding suggests that trustees' behavior may be more sensitive to the change in information treatments than investors' behavior, an observation that is consistent with the earlier findings from the No_Min and Min_No sessions.
In our design, there is no information available in the first period of a supergame ("sequence") in any treatment, so an alternative way to examine the treatment effect is to compare the frequencies of trust and reciprocity excluding the first periods. We can confirm that Findings 3-4 continue to hold when the first periods are excluded from the data analysis --the frequencies of Invest, Return-given-Invest, and Investand-Return excluding the first periods are given in Appendix C.
Although the frequencies of trust and reciprocity are significantly increased when information is freely provided or available for purchase, one may wonder whether efficiency is enhanced by information provision, especially in the case where information is costly. Support for Finding 5 comes from analysis of the session-level data in Table 4 . Using a one-tailed
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, we find that p<0.05 for both tests.
We next turn to a between-subjects analysis for our second set of 6 sessions. As before, we treat the first treatment in these 6 sessions as independent observations. Consistent with Finding 3, we find that providing a larger amount of information significantly increases the frequencies of Invest, Return-givenInvest, and Invest-and-Return (one-sided Robust Rank-Order test, p<0.05). This evidence again shows that the amount of information provided about trustees matters for enhancing trust and reciprocity.
We look for order effects by examining the third, Cost treatment of all 6 sessions. We find that none for all three tests). However, when free full or free minimal information are the second treatment of a session, following a first treatment of no information, the frequencies are not significantly different from one another (one-sided Robust Rank-Order test, p>0.1 for all three tests).
Finding 7: The frequencies of Invest, Invest-given-Return and Invest-and-Return under free and full information are greater than or equal to those observed under minimal information.
Summarizing the results of the paper to this point, we have several important findings. First, providing minimal information on trustee's prior behavior has an inconsistent effect on Invest, Returngiven-Invest and Invest-and-Return relative to no information. Providing a longer history on trustees' previous behavior has a larger and more consistent effect on trust and reciprocity compared to providing no information or minimal information on trustees' prior-period choices. The effect of the longer history of information is robust regardless of whether that information is provided before or after the No treatment, according to both a within-subjects and between-subjects analysis of session-level data. Second, making information available at a small cost yields outcomes that are similar to those observed when information is provided automatically without cost.
Use of Information
This subsection focuses on how investors' behavior varied with the information they had about trustees' past decisions. We first analyze the effect of no versus minimal information from our first set of experiments. We then examine the effect of minimal versus the larger amount of information provided in our second set of experiments. Finally we compare the case of free versus costly information. 
Minimal Information versus No Information
Finding 8: The frequency of Invest is significantly higher when the matched trustee's prior-period choice is "Return" than when it is "Keep" in the Min treatment but not in the No treatment.
We note that there is also an order effect, depending on whether "minimal information" is provided in the first or the second treatment of a session. The difference between the frequency of Invest conditional on "Return" and "Keep" is larger when the "minimal information" is provided in the second half of a session than when it is provided in the first half of a session, which implies that investors learn how to use information better after experiencing the absence of information. This finding is consistent with Finding 2.
Finally, Figure 3 also suggests that investors' behavior is not 100% dependent on the minimal 
Minimal Information versus Information
In the case of free information on longer histories of trustees' behavior, Proposition 2 states that there exists an equilibrium in which the trustee continues to play the contagious strategy but investors play a strategy that is conditional on the information revealed about the trustee. In particular, full trust and reciprocity is an equilibrium possibility in this information environment. In Figure 4 we compare the conditional frequency of Invest decisions by investors in the Min treatment from the first set of experiments with that in the Info treatment from the second set of experiments. For the Min treatment, the conditional frequency is based on whether the investor's currently matched trustee was revealed to have kept or returned in the prior period. For the Info treatment, the conditional frequency is based on whether the investor's currently matched trustee was revealed to have always kept (All Keep) or always returned (All Return) in all prior periods of the current supergame. Figure 4 provides support for the following: We further observe from the top panel of Figure 5 that investors purchasing information do not choose
Invest with a high frequency unless the trustee's Ratio of Return is also very high (0.8-1), perhaps owing to the cost the investors paid for information about their trustee.
How does behavior in the Cost treatment compare with the equilibrium prediction of Proposition 3? Table 5 provides some answers. 10 First, the most efficient equilibrium-the benchmark we use in our analysis of the data-has 1, i.e., investors who do not purchase information choose Invest 100% of 10 All analysis here excludes the first periods, where information is not available to purchase. Table 5 reveals, this prediction comes close to holding true in 4 of our 6 sessions -a t-test on the session level data indicates the frequencies are marginally significantly different from 1 (p=.09).
Figure 5: Frequencies of Invest Conditional on Trustee's Aggregate Ratio of Return
Conditional on 1, the efficient equilibrium prediction calls for investors to purchase information on trustees 56.3% of the time. As Table 5 reveals, the actual frequency of information purchase is significantly lower, averaging 24.49% (t-test p<.01). Combined with the finding that the frequency of trust and reciprocity is not significantly different between the Info and Cost treatment, we conclude that the mere availability of information creates a large positive externality for investors. While the overall frequency of Invest in the Cost treatment is 65.55% when information is purchased, as Table 5 reveals this frequency averages 72.48% when information is not purchased. Finally, we note that despite the lowerthan-predicted frequency of information purchase, trustees are nevertheless playing Return with high frequency in the Cost treatment. In fact we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the frequency of return given investment is not different from the efficient equilibrium prediction of 94.3% (t-test p>.10). In Table 6 we take a closer look at which subjects bought information and how often they bought information. Table 6 shows the frequency of information purchase decisions by each of the six subjects when that subject was assigned the role of investor in the Cost treatment. In Table 6 , frequencies over 0.5 are shown in bold face.
Notice that 9/36=1/4 of subjects purchased information more than 50% of the time (9 entries are in boldface). Approximately 1/2 of subjects (17/36) never chose to buy information. One subject was never assigned as an investor in the Cost treatment. The remaining 1/4 of subjects bought information at least once, but less than 50% of the time. 
Individual Behavior
In this section we explore the types of strategies that were adopted by individual investors in making investment decisions in both sets of experiments. Our method is to use a random-effects Probit regression model. In all specifications of this model, we always include several variables that capture fixed effects (sequence, period, order). Here, "sequence" refers to the supergame number and "period'' to the period number in a sequence. "Order" is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the session begins with minimal or full information and equals 0 otherwise. Following Camera and Casari (2009), we also introduce a set of regressors (dummy variables) that are used to trace out investor's strategies. In particular, we include a "grim trigger" dummy that equals 1 in all periods of a supergame following the first period of that supergame in which the investor experienced a defection by a trustee and equals 0 otherwise. We also include two "tit-for-tat" dummies that equal 1 in the first and second period respectively following a defection and equal 0 otherwise. Third, we include dummies that represent the information shown to the investor regarding to the current paired trustee's past behavior in the current sequence (Last return, All return, and All no return). "Last return" is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if information reveals that the current paired trustee returned last period. "All return" has a value of 1 if information reveals that the trustee returned every time the investor invested, and "All no return" has a value of 1 if the information reveals that the trustee never returned given investment. Finally, we create some interactive dummy variables that are the product of these previously defined dummy variables, e.g., Grim and Last return, Buy and All return, Buy and All no return, Buy and Last return. These interactive (multiplicative) dummy variables have a value of 1 only if both components equal 1, and are equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, "Buy information" is a dummy variable that is used only in the Cost treatment, having a value of 1 if the investor chose to purchase information and 0 otherwise. Table 7 are for the first set of experimental sessions (No_Min) and (Min_No) and reveal several important findings. First, a case can be made that subjects in the No treatment were playing in accord with the predictions of the contagious strategy, as evidenced by the significance of the negative coefficient associated with the grim trigger dummy and insignificance of all other left hand side variables (other than the constant term). By contrast, in the Min treatment, subjects were playing according to a mixture of motives, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the last return dummy variable and the negative and significant coefficients on the grim and grim-and-lastreturn dummy variables. The negative coefficient on the Grim-and-Last return interactive dummy variable implies societal enforcement concerns trump individual information in the Min treatment. 
The Probit Regression results in
Conclusion
We have studied the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among strangers in an indefinitely repeated trust game with random matching. By contrast with the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the trust game captures the one-sided incentive problem that arises in many everyday economic transactions. Indeed, the main focus of most reputation systems is on the behavior of trustees (second movers). The baseline treatment involves no information on trustees' (second mover) behavior, and a treatment variable is the amount of information provided on a trustee's prior history of play. A secondary treatment concerns whether information provision is free or costly. We have provided a simple theoretical model examining these various informational assumptions and have examined the predictions that follow from our model in a controlled laboratory experiment.
Although the parameters of the game were chosen to support a social norm of trust and reciprocity as an equilibrium in the baseline treatment with no information about trustees, we find that full trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain when no reputational information is available. Providing reputational information about trustees increases the frequencies of trust and reciprocity, and this effect becomes stronger and more consistent as the amount of information on the prior behavior of trustees is increased.
Furthermore, providing the possibility to purchase information at a small cost also significantly increases the frequencies of trust and reciprocity compared with the case where such information is absent. The latter result suggests that it may be the availability of information that matters even more than the actual content of that information. After all, only 24% of investors in our Cost treatment purchased information, and most who did not purchase information chose Invest anyway.
Our findings help us to comprehend the emergence and prevalence of reputation systems in economic interaction involving "strangers" and one-sided incentive problems such as the online feedback system found on eBay or the credit reports provided by credit bureaus. The significant contribution of this paper is that we have identified the importance of individual, reputational information over community-wide enforcement in increasing and sustaining trust and reciprocity and improving efficiency. This understanding is of obvious importance to the design and operation of economic institutions.
For future research, we are interested in designing and comparing different reputational mechanisms that improve the efficiency of the markets with random and anonymous players. For instance, one comparison is between an online, peer-to-peer feedback system (where information need not be truthful)
and a third party credit bureau (where information may be presumed to be more truthful and all players follow the contagious strategy}. Define and
is the increase in the sum of the expected probability (and also the expected payoff) of meeting a c-type investor for the d-type trustee in all the future periods when this d-type trustee chooses to deviate from defection (i.e. continues to return) given that the d-type trustee is the only d-type player in the community. Similarly, ) ( g is the increase in the sum of the expected payoff (and the probability of meeting a c-type investor) in future periods for the d-type trustee from slowing down the contagious process given that currently there is just one d-type trustee and one d-type investor. We show next that a one-shot deviation is not profitable for the investor or the trustee both on the equilibrium path and off the equilibrium path.
For the trustee on the equilibrium path, the payoff from following the strategy above is , while the payoff from a deviation is 1, with no payoff in all future periods. So the trustee has no incentive to deviate if .
For the trustee off the equilibrium path, the payoff from following the strategy is 1, the payoff while the payoff from a deviation is 1 , so the trustee has no incentive to deviate.
For the investor on the equilibrium path (when the information reveals the current trustee to be a ctype), the payoff from following the strategy is , and the payoff from deviation is , where Therefore the investor has no incentive to deviate on the equilibrium path.
For the investor off the equilibrium path (when the information reveals the current trustee to be a dtype), the payoff from following the strategy is , and the payoff from deviation is , where and are the investor's future payoffs given No Invest and Invest in the current period respectively.
Since the current trustee is a d-type, the investor's choice in the current period will not affect the number of d-type trustees in the future. Thus, equals and the investor has no incentive to deviate.
Proof of Corollary 1:
We will show that the following strategy under minimal information is an equilibrium strategy, but only for the knife-edge condition where . Specifically, the trustee chooses It is easy to verify that the investor will follow the proposed strategy (similar to the proof of Proposition 1). In particular, consider the incentive constraint for a d-type trustee given investment by the investor in the current period. The d-type trustee's payoff from choosing Keep in the current period is 1.
However, by choosing Return in the current period and waiting to play Keep in the next period, his payoff is 1 since the investor in the next period will choose Invest given the trustee's record of Return in found in Lee and Xie (2009 Therefore under minimal information, the proposed strategy is an equilibrium strategy only if .
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider the following strategies: In the first period, the investor always chooses Invest. In subsequent periods, the investor purchases information with probability . If he does not purchase The trustee's payoff from choosing Keep every period is 1 1 .
These two payoffs must be equal in the first period, so
Notice that is increasing in if . Thus, if the investor chooses Invest with a higher probability when no information is available, in equilibrium the probability for the investor to purchase information must be higher. The intuition for this finding is that if the investor increases the probability of invest under no information, she must at the same time decrease the probability of no information, otherwise all trustees will switch to always choosing Keep in every period.
In order to show that this is an equilibrium strategy, we also need to show that, given investment, the trustee will not switch from playing Return to playing Keep or from playing Keep to playing Return in every period, i.e., that p is constant. This is easy to verify since once the trustee chooses Keep in one period, then the best he can do (under full information) is to continue to choose Keep in every period.
Therefore, a trustee who chooses Keep in the first period has no incentive to switch to the other strategy in later periods. For a trustee who chooses Return in the first period, in every period he is facing the same constraint he faced in the first period, so in every period he will be indifferent between always choosing
Return and always choosing Keep given investment.
Next we show that investors have no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy. Consider first the investors who do not purchase information. These investors will follow a mixed strategy only if their payoff from Invest is equal to their payoff from No Invest, i.e., if . Since investors also randomize as to whether or not they will purchase information, the following equation must hold, 1 ,
where the last term of the equation is investor's payoff from purchasing information and is the cost of purchasing information.
Therefore, in equilibrium the fraction of good trustees is , and the cost of information is .
In particular, we are interested in two special cases: Investors who do not purchase information either choose Invest with probability zero (i.e., choose No Invest) or they choose Invest with probability one. should choose not to purchase information and No Invest with probability one. Therefore, the equilibrium reduces to the most inefficient equilibrium.
Case 2:
If the investors choose Invest with probability one when no information is purchased ( 1), the investors purchase information with probability and it must hold for that 1
. So the fraction of trustees who always choose Return given investment is , where
. From the parameters chosen in the experiment, 9/16 and 33/35.
Next we turn to the efficiency comparison.
(1) When 0 1, according to the equilibrium outcome, the investor's payoff in each period is . 
Proof of Corollary 2:
As noted in the text, when information is costly, there also exists an inefficient equilibrium where no investors purchases information or chooses Invest and no trustee chooses Return. It is easy to show that deviations from this equilibrium either on or off the equilibrium path are not profitable for either the trustee or the investor. The computer program will record your choice and the choice made by the player paired with you in this round. After all players have made their choices, the results of the round will appear on your screen.
You will be reminded of your own choice and will be shown the choice of your match, as well as the payoff you have earned for the round. Record the results of the round on your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate headings.
Immediately after you have received information on your choice and the choice of the player with whom you are randomly paired for the round, a ten-sided die with numbers from 0 to 9 on the sides will be thrown by one of you (you will take turns throwing the die) to determine whether the sequence will continue or not. The experimenter will announce loudly the result of each die roll. If a number from 0 to 7 appears, the sequence will continue into next round. If an 8 or 9 appears, the sequence ends. Therefore, after each round there is 80% chance that you will play another round and 20% chance that the sequence will end.
Suppose that a number less than 8 has appeared. Then you will play the same game as in the previous round, but with an individual selected at random whose role is different from yours. You record the outcome and your earnings for the round. Then another throw is made with the same die to decide whether If an 8 or 9 appears, the sequence ends. The experimenter will announce whether or not a new sequence will be played. If a new sequence is to be played then you will be randomly reassigned as a First Mover or a Second Mover. The new sequence will then be played as described above.
If the experiment does not end within 2 hours, you will be invited to continue the experiment in the next several days.
Earnings
Each point you earn is worth 0.5 cent ($0.005). Therefore, the more points you earn the more money you earn. You will be paid your earnings from all the rounds of all sequences in cash, and in private, at the end of today's experiment as well as $5 show-up fee.
Final Comments
First, do not discuss your decisions or your results with anyone at any time during the experiment.
Second, your ID# is private. Do not reveal it to anyone.
Third, since there is 80% chance that at the end of a round the sequence will continue, you can expect, on average, to play 5 rounds in a given sequence. However, since the stopping decision is made randomly, some sequences may be much longer than 5 rounds and others may be much shorter.
Fourth, your role as a First Mover or a Second Mover will be randomly assigned when a new sequence begins. Your role will not change for the duration of that sequence.
Finally, remember that after each round of a sequence you will be matched randomly with a player whose role is different from yours. Therefore, the probability of you being matched with the same individual in two consecutive rounds of a game is 1/3 since there are 3 First Movers and 3 Second Movers in the room.
Questions?
Now is the time for questions. Does anyone have any questions?
Quiz
If there are no more questions, please finish the quiz. Your answers to this quiz will not affect your earnings. The purpose of the quiz is to help you understand the instruction better. After everyone has completed the quiz the answers will be reviewed.
Continuation Instruction (Min_No sessions)
From now on until the end of today's experiment, everything is the same as in the original instruction except that there is no information available anymore to the First Mover about the decision that his/her paired Second Mover has made in the last round. 
Continuation Instruction (Info_No_Cost sessions)
